Ajivika doctrine reconsidered. by Johannes, Bronkhorst





råjño vadhaµ cik¥r∑ed yas tasya citro vadho bhavet 
åj¥vakasya stenasya varˆasaµkarakasya ca 
Mahåbhårata 12.86.21 
 
Ój¥vika doctrine reconsidered 
(Published in: Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion. Ed. Piotr Balcerowicz. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
2003. (Lala Sundarlal Jain Research Series, 20.) Pp. 153-178.) 
 
One of the mysteries that confront those who  study the religious context in which 
Buddhism arose is the religion of the Ój¥vikas, called Ój¥vikism by some modern scholars.1 
The Ój¥vikas, like the early Jainas and Buddhists, were Íramaˆas, ascetics who left their 
homes in order to find some kind of highest goal by practising various forms of asceticism. 
Unlike the early Jainas and Buddhists, however, they left no literature that has survived 
until today. Worse, there are no Ój¥vikas left today. The last Ój¥vikas may have lived in the 
fifteenth century, in the south of India, after which they disappeared. What we know about 
them mainly derives from Buddhist and Jaina literature, neither of which felt much 
sympathy for the Ój¥vikas, and presents its doctrines in a biased and often caricatural 
fashion. Ój¥vikism is — as A.L. Basham calls it in the subtitle of his classical study — a 
vanished Indian religion. 
 The sources of information about the religion of the Ój¥vikas have been collected 
and studied in exemplary fashion by A.L. Basham in his book History and Doctrines of the 
Ój¥vikas. This book came out in 1951 and has been reprinted several times since then. No 
study has appeared during the next half century that substantially adds to its conclusions. 
The contribution on the Ój¥vikas in Mircea Eliade's Encyclopedia of Religion (New York 
and London: Macmillan, 1987) has been written by the same author, A.L. Basham, and 
does little beyond summing up the contents of the book; the same is true of the article on 
Ój¥vikas in the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism (EncBuddh I, 1961-1965, pp. 331-333). More 
recently, Gustav Roth (1993) has restudied the Jaina sources on Gosåla Ma∫khaliputta and 
arrived at the conclusion that "the most ancient and the most primitive doctrine of the 
Ój¥vikas which originally existed before the development of a more elaborate system" is to 
be found in the "doctrine of the six ‘Unavoidables’: Gain and Loss, Happiness and Distress, 
                                                
1 In another study (Bronkhorst, 000c) it has been argued that the term åj¥vika (regularly åj¥vaka in Påli) is used 
in the Buddhist canon to refer to naked ascetics in general. The present article only deals with the “real” 
Ój¥vikas, who presumably constituted a subset of the group of all naked ascetics and shared, beside nudity, a 
number of beliefs and, perhaps, the habit of referring to themselves as Ój¥vikas. 
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Life and Death" (p. 420); this may be  true, but tells us little about the "more elaborate 
system". Some authors — most notably Claus Vogel in his The Teachings of the Six 
Heretics (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1970) — have criticised Basham's exclusive use of the 
Påli sources and his neglect of the Tibetan and Chinese translations, but add little to our 
understanding of Ój¥vikism.2 What is more, a more recent study by Graeme MacQueen 
which compares the different versions of the SËtra which is our most important source (A 
Study of the Íråmaˆyaphala-SËtra, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1988, p. 195), arrives at 
the conclusion "that [the Påli version], of all the versions, preserved the most ancient state 
of the text".3 In other words, Basham's study is reliable after all, in spite of the fact that he 
did not take all the source material into consideration. 
 Does this mean that since Basham no more can be said about this mysterious 
vanished religion? Has the last word been said about it until and unless some new sources 
are discovered which throw new light on this particular movement? I intend to show in this 
article that this is not necessarily the case. There is more to philology — the study of a 
culture on the basis of literary sources — than the mere linguistic analysis of those sources. 
The task of interpreting the contents of those sources in the light of what we know about 
their cultural and religious contexts is at least as important. After the initial task of 
collecting and reading the sources comes the next one of trying to understand what those 
texts are telling us. This latter task, I will argue, has not been carried out to the fullest extent 
possible in this case. 
 What then did the Ój¥vikas do, and what did they believe? To begin with the latter 
of these two questions, Basham points out that "[t]he cardinal point of the doctrines of its 
founder, Makkhali Gosåla,4 was a belief in the all-embracing rule of the principle of order, 
Niyati, which ultimately controlled every action and all phenomena, and left no room for 
human volition, which was completely ineffectual. Thus Ój¥vikism was founded on an 
unpromising basis of strict determinism, above which was developed a superstructure of 
complicated and fanciful cosmology, incorporating an atomic theory which was perhaps the 
earliest in India, if not in the world." (pp. 3-4). This is clear, and even though it is not 
immediately clear why anyone in ancient India should accept such a system of beliefs, it 
does not by itself present a major problem of understanding. 
                                                
2 Vogel, 1970: 1; see further MacQueen, 1984: 291 f.; 1988: 164 f. Vogel, 1970; Meisig, 1987; and 
MacQueen, 1988 provide parallel passages from the other traditions. 
3 Similarly MacQueen, 1988: 190: "[the Påli version] stands out as the most archaic of our texts". 
4 Perhaps the only passage in the Påli canon that explicitly, though not directly, associates Makkhali Gosåla 
with the Ój¥vikas is AN III.384, where PËraˆa Kassapa presents — out of six ‘classes’ — "the white class 
(sukkåbhijåti)" as being "the male and female Ój¥vikas (?; åj¥vakå åj¥vakiniyo)", and "the supremely white 
class (paramasukkåbhijåti)" as Nanda Vaccha, Kisa Sa∫kicca and Makkhali Gosåla. 
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 Such a problem comes up when we consider what the Ój¥vikas did. It is clear from 
the sources that the Ój¥vikas practised asceticism of a severe type which often terminated, 
like that of the Jainas, in voluntary death by starvation. This is peculiar. The Jainas, too, 
practised asceticism which might culminate in death by starvation, but in their case this 
made sense, as I will explain shortly. In the case of the Ój¥vikas the meaning of death by 
starvation is by no means obvious. If it makes no difference what one does, why should one 
choose severe asceticism and death by starvation rather than a more agreeable form of life?5 
 Basham's study throws no light on this riddle. It points out that the Buddhists, too, 
were perplexed. Basham tries to make sense of the situation in the following passage (p. 
228): "The usual Buddhist criticism of the Ój¥vika Niyati doctrine was pragmatic. ... Since 
there is no possibility of modifying one's destiny by good works, self-control, or asceticism, 
all such activity is wasted. The Ój¥vika doctrines are, in fact, conducive to luxury and 
licentiousness. This practical criticism of the Ój¥vika philosophy might have been easily 
countered by the Ój¥vikas with the claim that ascetics performed penances and led righteous 
lives under the compulsion of the same all-embracing principle as determined the lives of 
sinners, and that they were ascetics because Niyati so directed it. This very obvious 
argument occurs nowhere in the Buddhist scriptures, though it was known to the Jaina 
commentator Í¥lå∫ka, who quoted it as one of the arguments used by the niyativådins." 
This argument may seem obvious, yet it is unconvincing. It is and remains difficult to 
believe that the early Ój¥vikas engaged in painful asceticism for no other reason than that 
they thought that fate obliged them to do so. Even if this position turns out to be correct, it 
remains unintelligible without additional information as to its intellectual context. 
 Ój¥vikism and Jainism appear to have been very close to each other in the early 
days. Indeed, early Jaina texts present the founder of Ój¥vikism, Makkhali Gosåla, as a 
pupil of Mahåv¥ra. Gosåla subsequently broke away from Mahåv¥ra, but it seems a priori 
not unlikely that an understanding of the fundamental doctrines and practices of early 
Jainism will help us to reach a better understanding of Ój¥vikism. Our first task therefore is 
to determine in what essential respects Jainism and Ój¥vikism differed from each other. 
                                                
5 Cp. Dundas, 1992: 26: "it seems doubtful whether a doctrine which genuinely advocated the lack of efficacy 
of individual effort could have formed the basis of a renunciatory path to spiritual liberation". Dundas 
suspects "that the Jains and Buddhists deliberately distorted Ajivika doctrine for their own polemical 
purposes". Regarding the ascetic side of the religion of Makkhali Gosåla we have independent evidence in the 
following statement by the grammarian Patañjali (2nd cent. B.C.E.): må k®ta karmåˆi må k®ta karmåˆi ßåntir 
va˙ ßreyas¥ty åhåto maskar¥ parivråjaka˙ "because he said ‘do not perform actions, do not perform actions, 
peace is better for you’, he is Maskarin the wandering medicant" (Mahå-bh III p. 96 l. 13-14, on P. 6.1.154). 
Note however Roth, 1993: 422: "A comparison of Jaina Pkt. Gosåle Mankhali-putte and Påli Makkhali 
Gosålo with B. Sk. Maskar¥ Goßål¥-putra˙ shows that the latter, though it is closer to the Påli reading, is of 
secondary origin. In both cases the words of Jaina Pkt. Mankhali and of Påli Makkhali, connected with the 
name of Gosåla, with the ending -li instead of -ri, characterise themselves as variants of the eastern Mågadh¥ 
type of Pråkrit." 
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 Our information about early Jainism is not perfect. The earliest Jaina texts — the 
canon of the Ívetåmbara Jainas — were not written down until a millennium after the death 
of Mahåv¥ra, and only very few of these texts may date from a period close to that of 
Mahåv¥ra. These earliest texts, moreover, are sometimes difficult to interpret. However, a 
number of early Buddhist texts refer to the Jainas — whom they call nirgranthas — and tell 
us things about their beliefs and practices that agree with what the earliest Jaina texts tell 
us. From a comparison of these passages the following picture emerges. 
 Early Jaina asceticism was an attempt to stop activity and to put an end to karmic 
traces acquired earlier.6 It was a direct response to the challenge posed by the doctrine of 
karma, interpreted in a literal way: acts — i.e. physical and mental acts — produce results 
in this or a next life. Physical and mental immobility discards the traces left by earlier acts, 
and purifies the soul from all acts, with total liberation as ultimate outcome. The following 
passages from the Jaina canon illustrate this. The Uttarajjhayaˆa/Uttarajhåyå, for example, 
states in its 29th chapter: "By being without activity the soul does not bind new karma and 
destroys the karma that was bound before."7 "Having reached the state [of motionlessness] 
of the king of mountains, the homeless [monk] destroys the four parts of karma which 
[even] a kevelin possesses. After that [the soul] becomes perfected, awakened, freed, 
completely emancipated, and puts an end to all suffering."8 Also the Buddhist canon 
ascribes this belief to the Jainas. In the CËÒadukkhakkhandha Sutta of the Majjhima Nikåya, 
for example, Nigaˆ†ha Nåthaputta (or Nåtaputta, i.e. Mahåv¥ra) is reported to present his 
teachings in the following words:9 "Formerly, Nigaˆ†has, you performed sinful activities; 
you must exhaust that [sinful activity] by means of this severe and difficult practice. Being 
here and now restrained in body, speech and mind, amounts to not performing sinful 
activity in the future. Thus, as a result of the annihilation of former actions by asceticism, 
and of the non-performing of new actions, there is no further effect in the future; as a result 
of no further effect in the future there is destruction of actions; as a result of the destruction 
of actions there is destruction of suffering; as a result of the destruction of suffering there is 
                                                
6 Bronkhorst, 1993: chapters 1-3.  
7 Utt 29.37/29.38/1139: ajog¥ ˆaµ j¥ve navaµ kammaµ na baµdhaï, puvvabaddhaµ nijjarei. This and the 
following passages are also cited in Bronkhorst, 1993: 37, 27. 
8 Utt 29.61/29.62/1163: selesiµ pa∂ivanne aˆagåre cattåri kevalikammaµse khavei/ tao pacchå sijjhaï bujjhaï 
muccaï [parinivvåi]a savvadukkhåˆam aµtaµ karei. 
a This term is not found in Charpentier's edition. 
9 MN I.93 l. 2-10: atthi kkho vo nigaˆ†hå pubbe påpaµ kammaµ kataµ/ taµ imåya ka†ukåya dukkarakårikåya 
nijjaretha/ yaµ pan' ettha etarahi kåyena saµvutå våcåya saµvutå manaså saµvutå taµ åyatiµ påpassa 
kammassa akaraˆaµ/ iti puråˆånaµ kammånaµ tapaså byantibhåvå navånaµ kammånaµ akaraˆå åyatiµ 
anavassavo, åyatiµ anavassavå kammakkhayo, kammakkhayå dukkhakkhayo, dukkhakkhayå vedanåkkhayo, 
vedanåkkhayå sabbaµ dukkhaµ nijjiˆˆaµ bhavissatîti. See Bronkhorst, 1993: 29 n. 8 for further references. 
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destruction of sensation; as a result of the destruction of sensation all suffering will be 
exhausted." 
 This brief characterization does not of course exhaust what can be said about early 
Jainism. Yet it allows us to see the "logic" (if this is an appropriate term in this context) 
behind the tendency of Jaina ascetics to practise immobility, in the extreme case until death. 
This practice has a double objective: it destroys the traces of earlier deeds, and it binds no 
new karma. 
 It is also clear that Jainism accepted the doctrine of karma in a form in which bodily 
movement played a central role. Bodily movement leads to results, and in order to avoid 
those results bodily movement has to be halted. The early Buddhists did not share this 
understanding of the doctrine of karma. For them desire, or intention, was crucial. An early 
Buddhist sermon — the Upåli Sutta10 — contrasts the two interpretations, or attitudes. It 
points out that for the Jainas physical activity is central, for the Buddhists mental activity. 
Other passages allow us to interpret this more precisely. The Jainas did not only try to 
suppress bodily but also mental activity. The Buddhists, on the other hand, did not count 
mental activity as such as essential, but the intention behind it. Some Buddhist texts do not 
hesitate to ridicule the Jaina emphasis on bodily motionlessness and its resulting extreme 
discomfort. In the Devadaha Sutta of the Majjhima Nikåya the Buddha is recorded to have 
said:11 "If the pleasure and pain that beings feel are caused by what was done in the past, 
then the Nigaˆ†has surely must have done bad deeds in the past, since they now feel such 
painful, racking, piercing feelings." An early Jaina text pays back in kind by pointing out 
that a Buddhist who grills a child and eats it, but without knowing that he does so, is 
supposedly free of guilt, whereas that same Buddhist is guilty if he eats a gourd while 
thinking it is a baby. The passage, which occurs in the SËyaga∂a (SËtrak®tå∫ga), reads, in 
Bollée's (1999: 411-413) translation:12 "If someone puts a ball of oilcake on a spit and 
roasts it with the idea: this is a man, or a gourd, thinking it to be a baby, he becomes for us 
                                                
10 MN I.371 f. (no. 56). 
11 MN II.222: sace bhikkhave sattå pubbekatahetu sukhadukkhaµ pa†isaµvedenti, addhå, bhikkhave, 
Nigaˆ†hå pubbedukkatakammakårino, yaµ etarahi evarËpå dukkhå tippå ka†ukå vedanå vediyanti. Tr. 
Ñåˆamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 832. 
12 SËyaga∂a (SËtrak®tå∫ga) 2.6.26-28 (as found in Bollée, 1999): piˆˆåga-piˆ∂¥-m-avi viddhã sËle, ke¥ paejjå 
"purise ime" tti/ alåuyaµ våvi "kumårae" tti, sa lippa¥ påˆi-vaheˆa amhaµ// ahavåvi viddhËˆa milakkhu sËle, 
piˆˆåga-buddh¥Ï naraµ paejjå/ kumåragaµ våvi alåbuyaµ ti, na lippa¥ påˆi-vaheˆa amhaµ// purisaµ ca 
viddhËˆa kumåragaµ vå, sËlammi ke¥ pae jåya-tee/ piˆˆåga-piˆ∂aµ sai-m-åruhettå, buddhåˆa taµ kappai 
påraˆåe//. Jacobi translates (1895: 414): "If (a savage) thrusts a spit through the side of a granary, mistaking it 
for a man; or through a gourd, mistaking it for a baby, and roasts it, he will be guilty of murder according to 
our views [i.e., according to the views of the Buddhists]. If a savage puts a man on a spit and roasts him, 
mistaking him for a fragment of the granary; or a baby, mistaking him for a gourd, he will not be guilty of 
murder according to our views. If anybody thrusts a spit through a man or a baby, mistaking him for a 
fragment of the granary, puts him on the fire, and roasts him, that will be a meal fit for Buddhas to break fast 
upon." 
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soiled/soils himself for us with killing a living being. On the other hand, however, if a non-
aryan puts a man on a spit and roasts him, taking him for an oil-cake, or does the same to a 
child he thinks is a gourd, in our opinion he is not soiled with killing a living being. If (ca) 
someone puts a man or a child on a spit and roasts it on a fire taking it for a lump of oil-
cake, it would be fit for Buddhists to end their vow of fasting with." Passages like these, by 
contrasting the positions of Buddhists and Jainas, allow us to arrive at a clearer picture of 
early Jainism.13 
 Let us now turn to some of the textual passages that inform us about the doctrine of 
the Ój¥vikas. Basham's locus classicus is the Såmaññaphala Sutta of the Buddhist D¥gha 
Nikåya. In this sermon the views of the so-called six heretics are recorded. One of these is 
Nigaˆ†ha Nåtaputta, who is the same as Mahåv¥ra, the last Jaina t¥rtha∫kara who was a 
contemporary of the Buddha. His views should correspond to at least some extent to what 
we know about early Jainism, but the correspondence is not immediately obvious. Basham 
comments by saying (p. 17): "The teaching ascribed to Nigaˆ†ha Nåtaputta is very obscure, 
but, as Jacobi has pointed out, while it is not an accurate description of the Jaina creed it 
contains nothing alien to it."14 This may be a somewhat optimistic characterization of the 
situation,15 yet it is clear that the teaching attributed to the Jaina leader is recognizably 
Jaina. We may be well advised to take a similar stance with regard to the teachings 
supposedly characterizing Ój¥vikism: These teachings may not be an accurate description of 
the Ój¥vika creed, but they may contain little that is alien to it. 
                                                
13 Jainism does (come to) pay attention to intention. Note, however, the following remarks by John E. Cort 
(1999: 49): "The Jain conception of karma is well-known for its attention to both intention and unintentional 
action as being of equal importance; however, in academic presentations more attention is paid to the former. 
Scholars tend to focus  upon the way in which Jain praxis aims at the transformation of the psychological 
make-up of the subject, so that both consciously and unconsciously the person is acting in a way that will be 
karmically beneficial and in the end lead to liberation. But if all this is so much a matter of intention, then how 
do we account for the energy devoted for many centuries to disagreements over calendrical interpretation, 
disagreements concerned with ensuring that ascetic practices are performed on the proper days? If asceticism 
is a matter of intention, what does it matter if a person fasts or undertakes any other ascetic action on the 
fourth or the fifth of the lunar fortnight? The fervor with which disputants have argued their cases for many 
centuries indicates that it does matter on which day ascetic practices are observed." 
14 The reference is (indirectly) to Jacobi, 1880, where it is argued that the position described in the 
Såmaññaphala Sutta can be identified as belonging to Pårßva, Mahåv¥ra's predecessor. 
15 There can be no doubt that cåtu-yåma-saµvara-saµvuto of the Såmaññaphala Sutta alludes to the cåujjåma 
dhamma "the Four Restraints" of the followers of Pårßva, but it has repeatedly been pointed out (e.g. Rhys 
Davids, 1899: 75 n. 1; Walshe, 1987: 545 n. 115) that the specification of the Four Restraints in the Buddhist 
Sutta is quite different from the one found in the Jaina texts. The Jaina Èhåˆaµga 4.136 (ed. Ladnun), for 
example, states: bharaheravaesu ˆaµ våsesu purima-pacchima-vajjå majjhimagå båv¥saµ arahaµtå 
bhagavaµto cåujjåmaµ paˆˆavayaµti, taµ jayå: savvåo påˆåtivåyåo veramaˆaµ, savvåo musåvåyåo 
veramaˆaµ, savvåo adiˆˆådåˆåo veramaˆaµ, savvåo bahiddhådåˆåo veramaˆaµ "In the Bharahas and the 
Eravayas the Arhats in the middle, excepting the first and the last, preach the doctrine of the Four Restraints, 
viz. abstaining from killing living beings, abstaining from false speech, abstaining from taking what is not 
given, abstaining from sexual intercourse" (cp. Deleu, 1970: 256). 
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 The following is, in Basham's paraphrase (pp. 13-14), the teaching attributed to 
Makkhali Gosåla:16 
 
"There is neither cause nor basis for the sins of living beings; they become sinful 
without cause or basis. Neither is there cause or basis for the purity of living beings; 
they become pure without cause or basis. There is no deed performed either by 
oneself or by others, no human action,17 no strength, no courage, no human 
endurance or human prowess.18 All beings, all that have breath, all that are born, all 
that have life, are without power, strength, or virtue, but are developed by destiny, 
chance, and nature, and experience joy and sorrow in the six classes (of existence). 
 There are 1,400,000 chief uterine births, 6,000 and 600; 500 karmas, 5 karmas, 3 
karmas, a karma, and half a karma; 62 paths; 62 lesser kalpas; 6 classes (of human 
existence); 8 stages of man; 4,900 means of livelihood (?);19 4,900 ascetics; 4,900 
dwellings of någas; 2,000 faculties; 3,000 purgatories; 36 places covered with dust 
(?); 7 sentient births; 7 insentient births; 7 births from knots (?); 7 gods; 7 men; 7 
pisåca (births?); 7 lakes; 7 knots (?), and 700; 7 precipices, and 700; 7 dreams, and 
700; and 8,400,000 great kalpas through which fool and wise alike will take their 
course, and make an end of sorrow. There is no question of bringing unripe karma to 
fruition, nor of exhausing karma already ripened, by virtuous conduct, by vows, by 
penance, or by chastity. That cannot be done. Saµsåra is measured as with a bushel, 
with its joy and sorrow and its appointed end.20 It can neither be lessened nor 
increased, nor is there any excess of deficiency of it. Just as a ball of thread will, 
                                                
16 DN I.53-54 (cited by Basham, p. 14-15, n.3): N'atthi ... hetu, n'atthi paccayo sattånaµ saµkilesåya, ahetu-
apaccayå sattå saµkilissanti. N'atthi hetu, n'atthi paccayo sattånaµ visuddhiyå, ahetu-apaccayå sattå 
visujjhanti. N'atthi atta-kåre n'atthi para-kåre, n'atthi purisa-kåre, n'atthi balaµ n'atthi viriyaµ, n'atthi purisa-
thåmo n'atthi purisa-parakkamo. Sabbe sattå sabbe påˆå sabbe bhËtå sabbe j¥vå avaså abalå aviriyå niyati-
sa∫gati-bhåva-pariˆatå chass'evâbhijåtisu sukha-dukkhaµ pa†isaµvedenti. Cuddasa kho pan'imåni yoni-
pamukha-satasahassåni sa††hiñ ca satåni cha ca satåni, pañca ca kammuno satåni pañca ca kammåni t¥ˆi ca 
kammåni kamme ca a∂∂ha-kamme ca, dva††hi pa†ipadå, dva††h'antara-kappå, cha¬âbhhijåtiyo, a††ha purisa-
bhËmiyo, ekËna-paññåsa åj¥va-sate, ekËna-paññåsa paribbåjaka-sate, ekËna-paññåsa någâvåsa-sate, vise 
indriya-sate, tiµse niriya-sate, chattiµsa rajo-dhåtuyo, satta saññi-gabbhå, satta asaññi-gabbhå, satta nigaˆ†hi-
gabbhå, satta devå, satta månuså, satta pesåcå, satta sarå, satta pa†uvå, satta pa†uvå-satåni, satta papåtå, satta 
papåta-satåni, satta supinå, satta supina-satåni, cullâs¥ti mahå-kappuno satasahassåni yåni båle ca paˆ∂ite ca 
sandhåvitvå saµsaritvå dukkhass'antaµ karissanti. Tattha n'atthi: "iminâhaµ s¥lena vå vatena vå tapena vå 
brahmacariyena vå aparipakkaµ vå kammaµ paripåcessåmi, paripakkaµ vå kammaµ phussa phussa vyanti-
karissåmîti. H'evaµ n'atthi. Doˆa-mite sukha-dukkhe pariyanta-ka†e saµsåre, n'atthi håyana-va∂∂hane n'atthi 
ukkaµsâvakkaµse. Seyyathå pi nåma sutta-gu¬e khitte nibbe†hiyamånam eva phaleti, evam eva båle ca 
paˆ∂ite ca sandhåvitvå saµsaritvå dukkhass'antaµ karissanti. 
17 For the nom. sg. in -e (-kåre) see K.R. Norman, 1976: 240 f. 
18 I omit the additions made by Basham on the basis of Buddhaghosa's commentary. 
19 The Nålandå edition of this passage (as well as the PTS edition elsewhere, e.g. SN III. 211) has åj¥vaka-
sate; the translation will then be: 4,900 Ój¥vikas. This fits in well with the following paribbåjakas. 
20 Franke's translation (1913: 58) may have to be preferred: "Glück und Leid sind wie mit Scheffeln 
zugemessen, und die Dauer der Seelenwanderung hat ihren bestimmten Termin". 
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when thrown, unwind to its full length, so fool and wise alike will take their course, 
and make an end of sorrow." 
 
 Beside this passage from Buddhist literature, there is a passage in the Ívetåmbara 
Jaina canon that informs us about the teachings of Gosåla. It occurs in the Viyåhapannatti 
(= Bhagavat¥) and reads as follows:21 
 
"All those who have reached or are reaching or will reach salvation must finish in 
order 8,400,000 mahåkappas, seven divine births, seven groups, seven sentient 
births, seven ‘abandonments of transmigration’ (paü††a-parihåra), 500,000 kammas, 
and 60,000 and 600 and the three parts of kamma. Then, being saved, awakened, set 
free, and reaching nirvåˆa they have made or are making or will make an end of all 
sorrow." 
 
A comparison of these two passages leads Basham to the no doubt correct conclusion (p. 
219): "The close similarity shows that both passages are garbled borrowings from a 
common source." It also constitutes an important argument to look upon the passage in the 
Pali Såmaññaphala Sutta as providing historical information about the Ój¥vikas, even 
though there appear to be no precise parallels in Chinese and Tibetan.22 
 An analysis of these two passages induces Basham to conclude that Gosåla opposed 
the doctrine of free will. All and sundry are completely subject to the one principle which 
determines all things. He cites here once again the following words from the Såmaññaphala 
Sutta (p. 224-225): "Just as a ball of thread when thrown will unwind to its full length, so 
fool and wise alike will take their course, and make an end of sorrow." However, according 
to Basham "[t]his absolute determinism did not preclude a belief in karma, but for Makkhali 
Gosåla the doctrine had lost its moral force. Karma was unaffected by virtuous conduct, by 
vows, by penances, or by chastity, but it was not denied. The path of transmigration was 
rigidly laid out, and every soul was fated to run the same course through a period of 
                                                
21 Viy 15.101 p. 677 (Ladnun); 15.68 p. 712 l. 1-6 (Bombay): kei sijjhiµsu vå sijjhaµti vå sijjhissaµti vå 
savve te caürås¥tiµ mahåkappasayasahassåiµ, satta divve, satta saµjËhe, satta saˆˆugabbhe, satta 
paü††aparihåre, paµca kammaˆia sayasahassåiµ sa††hiµ ca sahassåiµ chac ca sae tiˆˆi ya kammaµse 
aˆupuvveˆaµ khavaïttå tao pacchå sijjhaµti bujjhaµti muccaµti parinivvåyaµti savvadukkhåˆam aµtaµ 
kareµsu vå kareµti vå karissaµti vå. Tr. Basham p. 219 (modified). Note that something very similar to the 
end of this passage (tao pacchå sijjhaï bujjhaï muccaï parinivvåi savvadukkhåˆaµ antaµ karei) occurs several 
times in Utt 29. Cp. note 8, above. 
a On kammaˆi, cp. Leumann, 1889: 339 (525); Schubring, 1954: 260 (472). Basham, quoting an edition not 
accessible to me ("with the comm. of Abhayadeva, 3 vols. Bombay, 1918-21"), reads kammåˆi.  
22 Cp. MacQueen, 1988: 167. 
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8,400,000 mahåkalpas." He cites in this connection another portion of the passage from the 
Såmaññaphala Sutta: "There is no question of bringing unripe karma to fruition, nor of 
exhausing karma already ripened, by virtuous conduct, by vows, by penance, or by chastity. 
That cannot be done." 
 A closer consideration of this portion suggests that Basham may have overstated his 
case. The portion speaks of "bringing unripe karma to fruition" and of "exhausting karma 
already ripened". We have seen that this is precisely what the Jainas tried to do. Asceticism 
in Jainism had a double function, as we have seen: "the annihilation of former actions, and 
the non-performing of new actions". Makkhali Gosåla, we now learn, maintains that the 
former of these two is impossible. Our two passages do not contradict the view that karma 
does determine the future condition of an individual. They, or at any rate the first one of 
them, reject the possibility that this process can be precipitated, but this may mean: karmic 
retribution takes its time, and virtuous conduct, vows, penance, and chastity do not hasten 
the process.23 
 In this way an interesting contrast between Ój¥vikism and Jainism becomes visible. 
The Jaina ascetic, by practising immobility, aspired to bring about a twofold effect: the 
annihilation of former actions, and the non-performing of new actions. The inactivity of the 
Jaina ascetic was not only meant to avoid producing karmic effects in the future, but also to 
destroy actions carried out in the past. The Ój¥vika denied that present inactivity can 
destroy actions carried out in the past. For him these former actions will carry fruit 
whatever one does. However, there is no reason to believe that he rejected the possibility of 
non-performance of new actions.24 We may therefore formulate the hypothesis that both 
Jainism and Ój¥vikism interpreted the doctrine of karma in the same way, believing that 
bodily and mental movements were responsible for rebirth. But whereas the Jainas believed 
that motionlessness might destroy past karma, the Ój¥vikas did not think so. 
                                                
23 Cp. Pande, 1974: 344-45: "it appears that once earned, the inheritance of Kaµma was held to be 
independent of individual will and supposed to work its way out along its own logic. ... It was considered 
necessary to exhaust the numerous but enumerated types of Kaµma prior to the attainment of liberation." 
Note that something not altogether dissimilar is ascribed (perhaps incorrectly) by Herodotus to the Egyptians. 
See Kirk, Raven and Schofield, 1983: 219-220, which translates Herodotus II, 123: "the Egyptians are the first 
to have maintained the doctrine that the soul of man is immortal, and that, when the body perishes, it enters 
into another animal that is being born at the time, and when it has been the complete round of the creatures of 
the dry land and of the sea and of the air it enters again into the body of man at birth; and its cycle is 
completed in 3,000 years. There are some Greeks who have adopted this doctrine, some in former times, and 
some in later, as if it were their own invention; their names I know but refrain from writing down." 
24 As late an author as Kamalaß¥la attributes this position to the Ój¥vikas: yac cåpy ucyate/ na kiµcit 
kußalådikarma kartavyam iti/ tatraivaivaµvadatå karmak∑ayån muktir ity åj¥vakavå(dåbhyupagamo) bhavet/ 
(Tucci, 1971: 20); “Now as for the statement ‘No wholesome or other act need be performed’, anyone who 
speaks like this on this point would be in agreement with the doctrine of the Ój¥vikas that liberation results 
from the ending of karma” (tr. Olson and Ichishima, 1979: 216 (42), modified). I thank Martin Adam for 
drawing my attention to this passage. 




 This does not yet solve all the problems surrounding Ój¥vikism. The central question 
remains unanswered: why did the Ój¥vikas adhere to their strict determinism? We may 
understand this question better by studying another position known from ancient India that 
might be called determinism, a position which is taught in the Bhagavadg¥tå. Let me try to 
put the message of this text into its historical context. 
 It is clear from various sources that there were people in ancient India who were 
neither Buddhists nor Jainas, but who shared with the Jainas the conviction that the doctrine 
of karma concerns physical and mental acts; these people had nonetheless found another 
way to reach liberation. This other way is insight into the true nature of the self. The self is 
here looked upon as being totally different from all that acts in a person. Knowing the true 
nature of the self implies: knowing that in reality one never acts. This insight separates one 
from the acts, which are henceforth known to belong to the body and the mind but not to 
the self, and leads to, or constitutes, liberation from the effects of one's acts. 
 This "other way" finds variously expression in numerous texts and traditions in 
India, and is indeed one of the corner stones of most Brahmanical philosophies. One aspect 
of this solution is not very often addressed in the earliest texts, but must have confronted all 
those who took this solution seriously. Knowing the true nature of one's self means: no 
longer identifying with the activities of body and mind. What happens at that moment to the 
activities of body and mind? Classical Såµkhya — one of the Brahmanical philosophies 
just referred to — offers the following answer: the material world will stop being active 
once the self withdraws itself, just as a dancer stops dancing when the spectators lose 
interest. This does not however provide much help to those who look for practical guidance 
after obtaining the desired insight.  
 Some rather different answers are associated with the Bhagavadg¥tå, from where 
they spread elsewhere, soon to gain widespread recognition. The position (or positions) of 
the Bhagavadg¥tå deserve(s) detailed attention here, for it (they) may throw light on the 
religious quest of the Ój¥vikas.25 
 The general theoretical background of the Bhagavadg¥tå is close to Såµkhya: the 
self is different from material nature, and this difference is to be realized. The question 
presents itself how matter, and more in particular the body accompanying a self (which 
includes in this discussion the mind), will continue once the difference between self and 
material nature is realized. Is there such a thing as the own nature of the body, which 
determines its activity independently of the involvement of a self? For the Bhagavadg¥tå 
                                                
25 The following reflections also occur in Bronkhorst, 000b. 
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there is. It is the own duty, the svadharma, of each person. Sometimes it is characterized as 
the own nature (prak®ti, 3.33; svabhåva, 18.41) of the person concerned. It is different for 
Brahmins, K∑atriyas, Vaißyas and ÍËdras: "Calm, [self-]control, austerities, purity, 
patience, and uprightness, theoretical and practical knowledge, and religious faith, are the 
natural-born actions of Brahmins. Heroism, majesty, firmness, skill, and not fleeing in 
battle also, generosity, and lordly nature, are the natural-born actions of warriors. 
Agriculture, cattle-tending, and commerce are the natural-born actions of artisans; action 
that consists of service is likewise natural-born to a serf."26 
 What counts in the Bhagavadg¥tå is the attitude with which these duties are to be 
carried out. A right attitude secures that material nature acts without involvement of the 
self. Non-involvement is central. It is fundamental that one dissociate oneself from one's 
actions, or rather from their fruits. Actions which are not inspired by the desire to obtain 
happiness or to avoid suffering do not produce karmic effects. They are as good as 
complete inactivity. The Bhagavadg¥tå poignantly impresses its message upon the warrior 
(k∑atriya) Arjuna who is about to destroy a major part of his family, and this makes the 
point very clear. Arjuna must carry out this task without concern for the disturbing results. 
"Holding pleasure and pain alike, gain and loss, victory and defeat, then gird thyself for 
battle; thus thou shalt not get evil."27 The trick in all this is a certain state of mind, a mental 
attitude, which we may call non-attachment: "In the mental attitude seek thy [religious] 
refuge; wretched are those whose motive is the fruit [of action]."28  
 Obtaining this mental attitude can be facilitated in various ways. Acting as an 
offering to K®∑ˆa is recommended: "Whatever thou doest, whatever thou eatest, whatever 
thou offerest in oblation or givest, whatever austerity thou performest, son of Kunt¥, that do 
as an offering to Me."29 Action is also depicted as a sacrifice: "Except action for the purpose 
of sacrifice, this world is bound by actions; action for that purpose, son of Kunt¥, perform 
thou, free from attachment [to its fruits]."30 Sacrifice implies giving to the gods, who in 
return give to the sacrificer. Devotion is a central theme of the Bhagavadg¥tå. Related to it 
                                                
26 Bhag 18.42-44 (= Mhbh 6.40.42-44): ßamo damas tapa˙ ßaucaµ k∑åntir årjavam eva ca/ jñånaµ vijñånam 
åstikyam brahmakarma svabhåvajam// ßauryaµ tejo dh®tir dåk∑yaµ yuddhe cåpy apalåyanam/ dånam 
¥ßvarabhåvaß ca k∑åtraµ karma svabhåvajam// k®∑igaurak∑yavåˆijyaµ vaißyakarma svabhåvajam/ 
paricaryåtmakaµ karma ßËdrasyåpi svabhåvajam// tr. Edgerton, modified. 
27 Bhag 2.38 (= Mhbh 6.24.38): sukhadu˙khe same k®två låbhålåbhau jayåjayau/ tato yuddhåya yujyasva 
naivaµ påpam avåpsyasi// tr. Edgerton, 1944: 23. 
28 Bhag 2.49cd (= Mhbh 6.24.49cd): buddhau ßaraˆam anviccha k®paˆå˙ phalahetava˙// tr. Edgerton, 1944: 
25. 
29 Bhag 9.27 (Mhbh 6.31.27): yat karo∑i yad aßnåsi yaj juho∑i dadåsi yat/ yat tapasyasi kaunteya tat kuru∑va 
madarpaˆam// 
30 Bhag 3.9 (= Mhbh 6.25.9): yajñårthåt karmaˆo 'nyatra/ loko 'yaµ karmabandhana˙/ tadarthaµ karma 
kaunteya muktasa∫ga˙ samåcara// tr. Edgerton, modified. 
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is the notion of casting, or depositing, one's actions on K®∑ˆa, or on Brahman. In verse 3.30 
K®∑ˆa invites Arjuna to cast all actions onto him, then to fight, free from longing and from 
selfishness.31 Verse 5.10 speaks, similarly, of "putting [all] actions in Brahman".32  
 In the Bhagavadg¥tå the right mental attitude is more important than the activity 
actually carried out. Once the mental attitude is in order, actions will follow suit: "Even if a 
very evil doer reveres Me with single devotion, he must be regarded as righteous in spite of 
all; for he has the right resolution. Quickly he becomes righteous (dharmåtmå) and goes to 
eternal peace."33 This suggests that the evil doer will soon turn to his svadharma. Right 
action is clearly the result of right attitude, not vice-versa. 
 Though the role of devotion to the Lord should not be underestimated, the 
Bhagavadg¥tå often creates the impression that this is just one means, perhaps beside others, 
for obtaining the right mental attitude. This right mental attitude is, we have seen it before, 
non-attachment to the fruit of action. The Bhagavadg¥tå contains passages which present 
knowledge of the inactive nature of the soul as a means to obtain this mental attitude. 
"Actions", verse 3.27 explains, "are, all of them, undertaken by the guˆas of Original 
Nature ( prak®ti). He who is deluded by egoism thinks ‘I am the doer’."34 The immediately 
following verses then continue: "But he, oh long-armed one, who knows the truth about the 
category guˆa and the category action, knowing that the guˆas move about among the 
guˆas, he does not get attached. Those who are confused by the guˆas of Original Nature 
( prak®ti) get attached to the guˆas and their actions. He who knows all should not disturb 
those dull [people] who do not know all."35 Here, then, the message of the Bhagavadg¥tå — 
cultivating a mental attitude of non-attachment with regard to the fruit of one's actions — is 
no longer an appendage to the way of insight. Insight is here a means (beside others) that 
may help a person to cultivate this mental attitude. 
 The method of the Bhagavadg¥tå is to be distinguished from other contemporary 
methods. The method of physical and mental immobility demanded extreme physical and 
mental control. Ideas and emotions played no active role, for they had to be suppressed. 
                                                
31 Bhag 3.30 (= Mhbh 6.25.30): mayi sarvåˆi karmåˆi saµnyasyådhyåtmacetaså/ niråß¥r nirmamo bhËtvå 
yudhyasva vigatajvara˙// 
32 Bhag 5.10 (= Mhbh 6.27.10): brahmaˆy ådhåya karmåˆi sa∫gaµ tyaktvå karoti ya˙/ lipyate na sa påpena 
padmapattram ivåmbhaså// 
33 Bhag 9.30-31ab (Mhbh 6.31.30-31ab): api cet suduråcåro bhajate måm ananyabhåk/ sådhur eva sa 
mantavya˙ samyag vyavasito hi sa˙// k∑ipraµ bhavati dharmåtmå ßaßvacchåntiµ nigacchati/ 
34 Bhag 3.27 (= Mhbh 6.25.27): prak®te˙ kriyamåˆåni guˆai˙ karmåˆi sarvaßa˙/ 
ahaµkåravimË∂håtmå kartåham iti manyate//. This verse and the verses cited in the next note are also quoted 
in Bronkhorst, 1993: 55. 
35 Bhag 3.28-29 (= Mhbh 6.25.28-29): tattvavit tu mahåbåho guˆakarmavibhågayo˙/ guˆå guˆe∑u vartanta iti 
matvå na sajjate //28// prak®ter guˆasaµmË∂hå˙ sajjante guˆakarmasu/ tån ak®tsnavido mandån k®tsnavin na 
vicålayet //29// 
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The method of insight into the true nature of the self, on the other hand, emphasized the 
intellectual element. Understanding the true composition of the world, and the place of the 
soul in it, was here deemed to secure liberation. The method of actions without 
consequences, propagated in the Bhagavadg¥tå, finally, put almost exclusive weight on 
what may be called an emotional state, an attitude of devotion, or sacrifice, of non-
attachment with regard to the fruit of one's actions. We have seen that insight into the true 
nature of the soul may help to obtain this state, and may indeed be a precondition for doing 
so, yet it would be a mistake to identify the two. The basically intellectual insight may help 
to bring about an emotional state which is not intellectual. 
 The Bhagavadg¥tå addresses an important problem connected with the belief in the 
possibility of liberation through insight: what happens to the body and its activities once 
insight is obtained? or perhaps: how do bodies act of their own, when the persons identify 
with their real selves and no longer with their bodies? The answer of the Bhagavadg¥tå can 
easily be interpreted to mean that the body, when left to its own devices, automatically 
carries out its caste duties. In other words, we are not far removed here from a fatalistic 
view of activity. Acts themselves, since they belong to the material world and not to the 
self, do not contribute to obtaining liberation. The self obtains liberation, precisely because 
it leaves acts to the material world, where they will take a certain direction (that of the caste 
duties) without affecting the self. 
 
 There is reason to believe that the Ój¥vika shared certain notions with the author of 
the Bhagavadg¥tå. Both, it seems, believed that bodies can act according to their own 
natures. For the author of the Bhagavadg¥tå this only happens when people realize their true 
identity; the activity they engage in will then be in accordance with their caste. The 
Ój¥vikas may not have believed that any special insight was called for. The real self being 
in any case inactive, bodies will always act according to their natures, which for them 
means that they will pass through all the stages specified in the passages studied earlier, and 
will reach, after 8,400,000 great kalpas, the stage where all karma has run its course.  
 The reason to think that the Ój¥vikas thought so is the following enigmatic passage, 
which is part of the passage from the Såmaññaphala Sutta cited earlier:36 "There is no deed 
performed either by oneself or by others, no human action, no strength, no courage, no 
human endurance or human prowess." The authenticity of this passage is confirmed by its 
                                                
36 N'atthi atta-kåre n'atthi para-kåre, n'atthi purisa-kåre, n'atthi balaµ n'atthi viriyaµ, n'atthi purisa-thåmo 
n'atthi purisa-parakkamo. 
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parallel in the Sa∫ghabhedavastu.37 This passage stands out in comparison to its 
surroundings, for it does not, unlike its surroundings, speak about living beings (Skt. sattva; 
Pa. satta) but about the self (Skt. åtman, Pa. atta; beside the other: para) and the person (Skt. 
puru∑a, Pa. purisa). Basham's translation may not draw sufficient attention to this change of 
terminology, which may yet be vital. Ótman and puru∑a are precisely the terms used by 
those schools and thinkers (such as Såµkhya) which maintain that the self does not act, and 
that activity belongs to material nature.38 What the present passage states is precisely this, 
that the self does not act . The following translation makes this clearer: "There is no deed 
performed either by [one's own] self or by [the self] of others, no action belonging to the 
puru∑a, no strength, no courage [belonging to the puru∑a], no endurance connected with the 
puru∑a or prowess connected with the puru∑a."39 
 It cannot be denied that the choice of terminology of the present passage is 
suggestive. It also supports the interpretation here proposed. According to the Ój¥vikas, the 
real self does not act. Activity belongs to the material world, which includes body and 
mind. According to the Bhagavadg¥tå, a body (and mind) left to its own devices follows its 
nature, which is the rules of the caste into which one is born. This very Brahmanical and 
caste-oriented way of looking at the nature of the material world was not shared by the 
Ój¥vikas, who had different ideas about this issue. According to them, a body that is left to 
its own devices — i.e., for them, every body — will pass through a large number of 
mahåkalpas, specified in the passages studied above. 
 The comparison with the Bhagavadg¥tå may explain another piece of information 
about the Ój¥vikas as well. PËraˆa Kassapa, another heretic whose views are described in 
the Såmaññaphala Sutta, appears to have been a teacher who was held in respect by the 
Ój¥vikas.40 His views, as presented in the Såmaññaphala Sutta and paraphrased by Basham, 
are as follows:41 
                                                
37 Gnoli, 1978: 221-222; Meisig, 1987: 136: nåsti puru∑akåra˙, nåsti paråkrama˙, nåsti puru∑akåraparåkrama˙, 
nåsty åtmakåra˙, na parakåra˙, anåtmakåraparakåra˙. 
38 SËyaga∂a 2.6.47 criticizes those who believe in "an unmanifest, great, eternal, imperishable and unchanging 
puru∑a" (Bollée, 1999: 426). Í¥lå∫ka ascribes this verse to Ekadaˆ∂ins, which term — as Bollée reminds us — 
may have covered the Ój¥vikas, beside others (Basham, p. 169 f.). Bollée adds the appropriate warning (1999: 
435 n. 26): "our commentators are Jains who might have known hardly more of these old and vague views of 
religious opponents than we". 
39 The fact that the following line states that all satta, all påˆa, all bhËta and all j¥va are without strength and 
without courage is no doubt meant to draw the conclusion that living beings, because their real selves have not 
strength and courage, don't really have them either. 
40 He alone —  unlike the other five heretics, including Maskarin Goßål¥putra — is presented as "chief of five 
hundred Ój¥vikas" (pañcamåtråˆåm åj¥vikaßatånåm pramukha˙) in the Sa∫ghabhedavastu of the 
MËlasarvåstivådins (Gnoli, 1978: 217; the views here attributed to PËraˆa Kåßyapa (p. 220-221) coincide 
however with those of Ajita Kesakambal¥ in the Såmaññaphala Sutta). He is several times presented as an 
Ój¥vika teacher in later texts; cf. Basham, 1951: 80 f. He is also the one who held that Nanda Vaccha, Kisa 
Sa∫kicca and Makkhali Gosåla constitute "the supremely white class" (see n. 4, above). Moreover, "[SN 
III.69] ascribes the first portion of Makkhali's views (as given in [DN I.53]) — that there is no cause, no 




"He who performs an act or causes an act to be performed ... he who destroys life, 
the thief, the housebreaker, the plunderer ... the highway robber, the adulterer and 
the liar ... commit no sin. Even if with a razor-sharp discus a man reduce all the life 
on earth to a single heap of flesh, he commits no sin ... If he come down the south 
bank of the Ganges, slaying, maiming, and torturing, and causing others to be slain, 
maimed, or tortured, he commits no sin, neither does sin approach him. Likewise if 
a man go down the north bank of the Ganges, giving alms and sacrificing, and 
causing alms to be given and sacrifices to be performed, he acquires no merit, 
neither does merit approach him. From liberality, self-control, abstinence, and 
honesty is derived neither merit, nor the approach of merit." 
 
It is more than probable that PËraˆa's position is not here presented in the most favorable 
light. Moreover, we have seen that the Jainas did not shy away from accusing the Buddhists 
of being able to eat babies without incurring sin. The Jainas had a point there, which they 
however exaggerated beyond all reasonable proportions. It makes sense to assume that the 
Buddhist texts that describe the position of PËraˆa Kassapa do the same. They exaggerate 
beyond reasonable proportion a position, or the consequences of a position, which yet 
belonged, in this or in a closely similar form, to PËraˆa Kassapa, and therefore probably to 
the Ój¥vikas. 
                                                                                                                                               
reason for depravity or purity — to PËraˆa Kassapa" (DPPN II p. 398 s.v. Makkhali-Gosåla n. 1). — It is 
noteworthy that Maskari(n) and PËraˆa are mentioned by Bhåskara I as earlier mathematicians (Pingree, 
1981: 59); see Shukla, 1976: liii-lv, 7 l. 7 (on Óryabha†¥ya Daßag¥tikå 1), 67 l. 4 (on Óryabha†¥ya Gaˆitapåda 
9). 
41 DN I.52-53 (partly cited by Basham, p. 13 n. 1): Karato kho mahåråja kårayato chindato chedåpayato 
pacato påcayato socayato kilamayato phandato phandåpayato påˆaµ atimåpayato, adinnaµ ådiyato, sandhiµ 
chindato, nillopaµ harato ekågårikaµ karoto paripanthe ti††hato, paradåraµ gacchato, muså bhaˆato, karoto 
na kar¥yati påpaµ. Khura-pariyantena ce pi cakkena yo imisså pa†haviyå påˆe eka-maµsa-khalaµ eka-
maµsa-puñjaµ kareyya, n'atthi tato-nidånaµ påpaµ, n'atthi påpassa ågamo. Dakkhinañ ce pi Ga∫gå-t¥raµ 
ågaccheyya hananto ghåtento chindanto chedåpento pacanto påcento, n'attho tato-nidånaµ påpaµ, n'atthi 
påpassa ågamo. Uttarañ ce pi Ga∫gå-t¥raµ gaccheyya dadanto dåpento yajanto yajåpento n'atthi tato-nidånaµ 
puññaµ, n'atthi puññassa ågamo. Dånena damena saµyamena sacca-vajjena n'atthi puññaµ, n'atthi puññassa 
ågamo. A résumé of this position in verse is given SN I.66. Essentially the same position is attributed to 
Sañjay¥ Vaira††¥putra in the MËlasarvåstivådin Sa∫ghabhedavastu (Gnoli, 1978: 222-223; Meisig, 1987: 144): 
kurvata˙, kårayata˙, chindata˙, chedayata˙, pacata˙, påcayata˙, hiµsato, ghåtayata˙, pråˆino hiµsata˙, 
adattam ådadata˙, kåme∑u mithyå carata˙, saµprajånan m®∑åvådam bhå∑amåˆasya, madyapånam pibata˙, 
sandhiµ chindata˙, granthiµ muñcata˙, nirlopaµ harata˙, paripanthaµ ti∑†hata˙, gråmaghåtaµ kurvata˙, 
nagaraghåtam, janapadaghåtam, k∑uraparyant¥k®tena vå cakreˆa ye 'syåµ mahåp®thivyåµ pråˆinas tån sarvån 
saµchindata˙, saµbhindata˙, saµku††ayata˙, saµpradålayata˙, tån sarvån saµchindya, saµbhindya, 
saµku††ya, saµpradålya, ekamåµsakhalaµ kurvata˙, måµsapiˆ∂aµ, måµsapuñjam, måµsaråßim; idaµ 
pratisaµßik∑ato nåsty atonidånaµ påpam; nåsty atonidånam påpasyågama˙; dak∑iˆena nad¥µ gaµgåµ 
chindan bhindan vågacchet, uttareˆa vå nadyå gaµgåyå dadat yajamåna˙ ågacchet, nåsty atonidånam 
puˆyapåpam; nåsty atonidånaµ puˆyapåpasyågama˙; yaduta dånena, damena, saµyamena, arthacaryayå 
samånårthatayå iti kurvatå na kriyate eva puˆyam iti. 
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 Let us now draw the Bhagavadg¥tå into the picture. K®∑ˆa encourages Arjuna not to 
avoid battle and the killing of his relatives, and says:42 "He who thinks of him (i.e., the soul 
inhabiting the body) as killer, he who deems him killed, both of these possess no 
knowledge; he does not kill and is not killed. Never is he born or dies; he has not come to 
be, nor will he come to be; unborn, permanent, eternal, ancient, he is not killed when the 
body is killed." Here we meet with a statement — not this time from a critic but from the 
author of the Bhagavadg¥tå himself — to the extent that killing is allowed in certain 
circumstances, or more appropriately, that killing has no karmic consequences — is no sin 
— in Arjuna's situation. 
 It would seem, then, that both Ój¥vikism and the Bhagavadg¥tå allow for the 
possibility that the body, when left to its own devices, will kill its fellow human beings. For 
both there is nothing wrong with this; the Bhagavadg¥tå goes to the extent of warning 
Arjuna not to try to stop this process. PËraˆa may have thought that there was no way this 
process could be stopped. The parallelism appears to go further. The Bhagavadg¥tå, as we 
have seen, denies that actions are carried out by the self; they "are, all of them, undertaken 
by the guˆas of Original Nature ( prak®ti). He who is deluded by egoism thinks ‘I am the 
doer’". The account of PËraˆa is, similarly, resumed in the one word akiriyå "non-action".43 
 What is the place of asceticism in the Ój¥vika vision of the world? If our reflections 
so far are correct, the answer must now be evident. Asceticism cannot destroy the traces of 
acts committed in earlier lives, or even earlier in the present life. But asceticism in Jainism 
had a double function: "the annihilation of former actions, and the non-performing of new 
actions". Annihilating former actions is not recognized as possible by the Ój¥vikas, but non-
performing new actions is possible. It is even essential at the end of the long series of lives 
during which, at last, all former actions have borne fruit. The Ój¥vika takes longer, much 
much longer, than his Jaina confrère to annihilate former actions, because he does not 
recognize asceticism as a means to accomplish this. He has to live through 8'400'000 great 
kalpas to bring this about. But at the end he too, like the Jaina monk, has to abstain from 
further activity. Like the Jaina ascetic who is close to his goal, also the Ój¥vika who is close 
to it must starve himself to death, without doing anything whatsoever. 
 
* * * 
                                                
42 Bhag 2.19-20 (Mhbh 6.24.19-20): ya enaµ vetti hantåraµ yaß cainaµ manyate hatam/ ubhau tau na vijån¥to 
nåyaµ hanti na hanyate //19// na jåyate mriyate vå kadåcin, nåyaµ bhËtvå bhavitå vå na bhËya˙/ ajo nitya˙ 
ßåßvato 'yaµ puråˆo, na hanyate hanyamåne ßar¥re //20//. On the interpretation of verse 20b, see Bronkhorst, 
1991: 303. 
43 DN I. 53 (§ 18): ... PËraˆo Kassapo sandi††hikaµ såmaññaphalaµ pu††ho samåno akiriyaµ vyåkåsi. The 
Gilgit Sa∫ghabhedavastu attributes this position (akriyå) to Sañjay¥ Vaira††¥putra (Gnoli, 1978: 223). 




The above considerations, it is hoped, have made Ój¥vika doctrine somewhat more 
comprehensible in its historical context than it has been so far. Basham's excellent study 
had left us with the idea that a fatalistic doctrine — whose links with other contemporary 
doctrines and with the ascetic practices of the Ój¥vikas themselves remained unclear — had 
somehow been able to establish itself as the core of a new religion. Basham may not be 
blamed for this, for the textual evidence is incomplete, biased, and far from perfect. Yet it is 
to be kept in mind that religious currents do not normally cristallize around just any idea. 
More often than not religious doctrine — especially the doctrines of "new religions" — 
shares features with other contemporary religious currents, or addresses issues that are 
somehow felt to be important in the society concerned. Ój¥vikism, it now appears, shared a 
concern for the doctrine of karma with the other religious currents known to have existed in 
its time: Buddhism, Jainism, and even some of the contemporary developments of Vedic 
religion. From among these religious currents it was closest by far to Jainism, which is 
hardly remarkable in view of the fact that the Jaina tradition presents Makkhali Gosåla as a 
one-time pupil of Mahåv¥ra. The most important difference between Ój¥vikism and Jainism 
appears to have been the Ój¥vika view that asceticism cannot annihilate former karma. The 
automatic consequence of this position is that the Ój¥vikas, in order to reach liberation, will 
have to wait for former karma to run its own course. This takes long, but not forever: the 
Ój¥vikas somehow arrived at a total duration of 8'400'000 great kalpas. Once arrived at the 
end of this period, the Ój¥vikas, like their Jaina counterparts, will have to engage in 
asceticism, more precisely: in the non-performing of new actions. They, like the Jaina 
ascetics, will choose a way of dying that is as inactive as possible: the Jainas through 
starvation, the Ój¥vikas, it appears, through thirst. 
 Linked to this particular notion as to how liberation can be attained, the Ój¥vikas 
appear to have believed in the inactive nature of the self. This, if true, would point to a 
resemblance between the main message of the Bhagavadg¥tå and the doctrine of the 
Ój¥vikas. Both would then recognize in each individual a self that does not act, and a bodily 
part (which includes the mind) that does act. Knowing that one's self is essentially different 
from one's body induces people to let the body follow its own nature; this own nature of the 
body is in the Bhagavadg¥tå one's svadharma, one's caste duties, and for the Ój¥vikas 
something else, most probably expressed in the long list of incarnations one has to pass 
through. 
 The main reason for believing that the self, for the Ój¥vikas, was by its nature 
inactive, is the phrase preserved in the Såmaññaphala Sutta describing their position: 
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"There is no deed performed either by [one's own] self or by [the self] of others, no action 
belonging to the puru∑a, no strength, no courage [belonging to the puru∑a], no endurance 
connected with the puru∑a or prowess connected with the puru∑a." However, it is not 
impossible that earliest Jainism, too, had a similar conception of the self. Classical, i.e. 
later, Jainism has a different conception of the soul, as is well known. This classical 
conception, however, appears to have developed at a later time.44 
 Dalsukh D. Malvania (1981) and others have pointed out that the early Jaina 
concept of the soul was indeed very different from the classical concept which developed in 
the course of time. Óyåra 176, he points out, describes the soul in the following terms:45 "It 
is not long nor small nor round nor triangular nor quadrangular nor circular; it is not black 
nor blue nor red nor green nor white; neither of good nor bad smell; not bitter nor pungent 
nor astringent nor sweet; neither rough nor soft; neither heavy nor light; neither cold nor 
hot; neither harsh nor smooth. It does not have a body, is not born again, has no attachment 
and is without sexual gender. While having knowledge and sentience, there is nonetheless 
nothing with which it can be compared. Its being is without form, there is no condition of 
the unconditioned. It is not sound nor form nor smell nor flavour nor touch or anything like 
that." (tr. Jacobi, 1884: 52, emended as in Dundas, 1992: 38). Óyåra 171, moreover, 
states:46 "That which is the soul is that which knows, that which is the knower is the soul, 
that by which one knows is the soul." (tr. Dundas, 1992: 38). It is not therefore impossible 
that the soul at this early period was not believed to participate in the activity of the body. A 
passage in Óyåra 3 which describes the Jaina as åtmavådin, lokavådin, karmavådin and 
kriyåvådin is not necessarily in conflict with this.47  
                                                
44 On the development of this concept, see Bronkhorst, 0000. 
45 Óyåra I.5.6.176 (B p. 56-57) / I.5.6.170 (D, p. 153 f.) / I.5.6.4 (S p. 26) / I.5.6.127 f. (L p. 47): se na d¥he na 
hasse na va††e na taµse na caüraµse na parimaˆ∂ale na kiˆhe na n¥le na lohie na hålidde na sukkile na 
surabhi-gandhe na durabhi-gandhe na titte na ka∂ue na kasåe na ambile na mahure na kakkha∂e na maüe na 
garue na lahue na s¥e na uˆhe na niddhe na lukkhe na kåË na ruhe na sa∫ge na itth¥ na purise na annahå 
parinne sanne uvamå na vijjaï, arËv¥ sattå, apayassa payaµ n'atthi, se na sadde na rËve na gandhe na rase na 
phåse icc-eyåvanti. (the reading follows ed. Schubring). 
46 Óyåra I.5.5.171 (B p. 55) / I.5.5.165 (D p. 151) / I.5.5.5 (S p. 25) / I.5.5.104 (L p. 45): je åyå se vinnåyå, je 
vinnåyå se åyå, jeˆa vijåˆaï se åyå (the reading follows ed. Schubring). 
47 Óyåra I.1.1.3-5 (B p. 3) / I.1.1.5-7 (D, p. 15-16) / I.1.1.5 (S p. 1) / I.1.1.5-7 (L p. 4): se åyå-vå¥ logå-vå¥ 
kammå-vå¥ kiriyå-vå¥. ‘karissaµ c'ahaµ, kåråvessaµ c'ahaµ karao yåvi samaˆunne bhavissåmi’ — eyåvant¥ 
savvåvant¥ logaµsi kamma-samårambhå parijåˆiyavvå bhavanti (the reading follows ed. Schubring). Jacobi 
(1884: 2) translates: "He believes in soul, believes in the world, believes in reward, believes in action 
(acknowledged to be our own doing in such judgments as these): ‘I did it;’ ‘I shall cause another to do it;’ ‘I 
shall allow another to do it.’ In the world, these are all the causes of sin, which must be comprehended and 
renounced." Schubring’s translation (1926: 67) shows that no activity of the soul is necessarily thought of: “Er 
glaubt [also] and ein Ich, an eine Welt, an die [Rückwirkung aller] Handlungen und an die Willensfreiheit. 
[Weil er an diese glaubt, sagt er:] ‘ich will handeln, ich will zu handeln veranlassen,und ich will dem 
zustimmen, der da handelt.’ Alle diese Betätigungen durch Handlung in der Welt müssen [als schädlich] 
erkannt werden.” 
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 Malvania draws attention to the similarity with Upani∑adic ideas, and believes that 
the Óyåra "is not free from the influence of the Upani∑ads". This may or may not be true. It 
may not however be superfluous to recall that these Vedic texts themselves appear to have 
borrowed48 (and adjusted)49 these ideas from others. Unfortunately we have no precise 
information about the religious movements from which these Upani∑ads borrowed. Could it 
be that the Ój¥vikas and the Jainas (which both appear to haved existed well before 
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